“Ochsner Clinic and Hospital: Hard
Lessons from the Big Easy”, Imaging Economics, © Stephen Krcmar, 2/06
Having a disaster plan in place is critical, but
Ochsner learned that ingenuity, flexibility, and having the right people
on hand are what will keep an institution afloat.
On Thursday, August 25, 2005, Tropical Storm
Katrina was upgraded to Hurricane Katrina, the fourth hurricane of 2005.
By the end of the day, it had touched down in Florida and surprised
forecasters when it changed direction and started paralleling the
coastline in Miami. By Friday morning, the eye of the storm was located
offshore of southwestern Florida and heading toward Louisiana where the
governor promptly declared a state of emergency. As federal troops were
deployed to Louisiana, the radiology department at Ochsner Clinic
Foundation in New Orleans was putting their disaster plan into action.
"We knew that we needed to prepare ourselves to
be in this for the long haul, that this was going to be very difficult for
our employees, for our patients, and for this community. We were going to
have lots of challenges to meet," says Suzanne Young, RT(R), CRA, the
administrative director of radiology.
At 5 am on Saturday, the hurricane reached
Category 3 intensity as it charged across the Gulf of Mexico. Ochsner
could withstand a Category 3, according to Edward Bluth, MD, chairman of
radiology. He thought that the structure could possibly withstand a
Category 4 hurricane but was unsure about the effects a Category 5 would
have. "If it was really a level 5, it might be a tremendous problem,"
Bluth recalls thinking.
At 7 am on Sunday, Katrina was upgraded to a
Category 5 hurricane while it stormed over the Gulf. At Ochsner, the
clinical personnel of "Team A" who were slated to cover the next 6 days at
the hospital had just arrived. Daniel DeVun, MD, Dana Smetherman, MD, and
John Eick, MD, were the three radiologists on duty who would work with
three residents. The team of six reviewed emergency RIS and PACS
protocols, making sure they had hard copies of documents that they might
need but would not be accessible if the storm shut down computers. During
this meeting, assignments were also reviewed as well as pager and wireless
in-house phone numbers.
The team had been selected carefully to make sure
that all modalities were covered and that there was redundancy, so the
hospital would not be left in the lurch if something happened to a single
specialist.
During the afternoon, the hurricane had
strengthened to a strong Category 5 with 175 mph sustained winds and 216
mph gusts. By 7 pm on Sunday evening, the storm was less than 12 hours
away from landfall: 17 members of the clinical support staff had arrived
and were led by Young, who went over their duties for the 12-hour shifts.
The group also discussed the equipment that was on backup power and where
it was located.
Machines that were connected to emergency power
were easy to identify. Unlike the traditional, off-white outlets, the
outlets connected to emergency power are red and a lot more of these plugs
had been added recently, just in case nursing home patients needed to be
housed during a disaster. The CR units, portable x-ray units, and crash
carts were also on these "red plugs" and placed strategically throughout
the building. The redistribution of technology was done long before the
storm hit because if the city power went down, so did the elevators.
"It's one thing to take patients and carry them
up and down stairs. It's another thing to carry equipment," Young notes.
Downtime was also discussed during the morning
meeting, nailing down a plan for sleeping arrangements and talking about
food and water supplies. Every water cooler in the hospital had 5,
five-gallon backups and 10 cases of gallon jug water were on hand in the
radiology department.
Employees would sleep in one of two rooms the
department had obtained at the Brent House, a hotel connected to the
hospital. There was a room designated for men, the other was for women.
The floors of both rooms were covered with air mattresses. Army cots were
also strategically placed throughout the hospital. This still would not be
enough: During the week, gurneys and the flat surfaces of various
diagnostic imaging equipment would also be utilized for shut-eye.
Then they went to work: finding 55 gallon drums,
filling them up with water, and placing them outside bathrooms so that
there would be water to flush the toilets. They also gathered all 20 box
fans designated for the department that would help circulate the air and
fight rising humidity levels.
As they worked, the hospital was evacuating
patients. Only the very sick who could not travel were left at the
institution.
Bluth had spent many hours thinking about
disaster preparedness in the past and had come to believe that these
situations required an approach that looked at the hospital holistically.
"We had to think as an institution, not as a
radiology department," Bluth says. And although preparation is incredibly
important, Bluth emphasizes the importance of improvisation when it comes
to the actual disaster. "There really is no organized preparation for the
actual event, you have to play it by ear," says Bluth. "You have to be
constantly vigilant."
THE PLAN
The extensive prehurricane plan had been refined
over many years, and one of the primary focuses concerned essential
personnel. As a plan, the umbrella of possible situations included a range
of events like a plane crash, terrorist attack, or natural disaster. The
radiology department's primary concern was ensuring that all modalities
were covered while putting the fewest personnel in harm's way.
"You have to set up your team correctly. They
have to be able to be freestanding and be able to exist independent of the
rest of the world," says Bluth.
An autonomous and independent department means
having multiple solutions for the same problem. If one machine was
inoperable, having a backup plan is imperative.
Ochsner had multiple hurricane alerts in the past
and adjusted the numbers of doctors and residents with each one. Lower
numbers put fewer people at risk, but put more stress on the staff on
duty. Larger numbers spread out the work more thinly but put more staff in
harm's way.
"We knew that once a disaster took place, it
wouldn't just be overnight," says Bluth. "We had to have an adequate
number of people so they could rest."
Each of three teams was assigned to take the
first watch for a different hurricane season. The team would work for 7
days before being relieved by the second team. The second team would be
relieved by the third team after 7 days. After each event, there would be
a post-analysis. In addition to changing the levels of staffing, they
tried different policies concerning family.
"We realized that you had to limit family
members, which is a big emotional problem for a lot of people, but that
was a lesson learned," says Bluth. In the past, the department tried
different things, forbidding family members at times and allowing many
relatives at other times.
During Katrina, employees were encouraged to have
relatives evacuate to safer areas. If the staff member was not comfortable
sending their spouse away, common in couples that did not have children
living with them, the spouse was welcome in the hospital. Many family
members stayed in the lobby, where they pulled chairs together to create
makeshift beds. Many of these spouses and relatives made the transition to
volunteers. When a machine went down in the emergency department, it
became necessary to run cassettes to the radiology department on the
second floor, and it was volunteers who handled this 5-minute trip.
"I was very pleased," says Young speaking about
the volunteers. "They stepped up and helped us every step of the way."
Single mothers also had a place for their
children at Ochsner, which had day care on the premises, a necessity
learned during previous hurricane alerts. Employees with kids in tow were
incapable of carrying out their job duties.
Four-legged and flying loved ones were also taken
into consideration. Initially, pets were not allowed. That decision caused
a lot of consternation. So, Ochsner changed the policy during the early
stages of the storm: try to make alternative arrangements, they instructed
staff. But for those who could not and had to be at the hospital, their
animals were welcome as long as they were caged.
Young was hoping she would not have to resort to
bringing her boxer to work. She had planned for a friend to pick up the
canine and take it to Alabama. But the storm rolled in so fast, that was
not possible.
The dogs, cats, rabbits, and birds did not end up
inside the hospital itself. The atrium of the parking garage was used for
that. Staff members took turns walking, feeding, and giving water to the
animals.
The hospital has about 20 full-time radiologists,
21 residents, one fellow, and a staff of about 350. During the week,
staffing levels hover at roughly 250 employees and 14 radiologists.
Weekend staffing is lower. During last year's disaster, the department
operated with staff numbers that ranged between 10% and 17%, according to
Young.
"I was very glad that we had technologists that
could cross cover in other areas. But I can't say that we had too few
people, nor can I say we had too many," says Young. "We had the right
amount. We all had to pull together and do things like mop and help out in
laundry and those kinds of things. We had the right amount of people to
work our environment as well as care for our jobs."
There also were many portable restrooms on site.
The team had learned that these units were important to have on hand when
water was not available to flush toilets.
KATRINA HITS
As the storm rolled in, so did the phone calls.
But the folks on the other end were not all searching for immediate
medical help. They were from employees in dire situations: stuck on a roof
with rising water or sitting in traffic with a dying cell phone battery
and no place to go. For some situations, employees inside Ochsner could do
little more than listen to those on the other end. In other situations,
messages were passed on to administrators who worked to coordinate help.
To make a tough situation more difficult, the communication infrastructure
was starting to fracture.
Phone calls were not being routed to the correct
lines, so the phone was ringing off the hook and almost all of the calls
had to be rerouted. There were only two people on hand to deal with the
calls and answer the diversity of questions. But employees who had
multiple job duties handled this task. It took some callers as many as 2
days to get through and many were frantic.
"People were seeing all these horror stories on
the news," says Young. "For us, we were just trying to mop and get air
conditioning ... we were dealing with our own world. So having someone
here who could give out basic information and take basic information and
arrange so that when we needed someone, we would know how to contact them,
is definitely something I would suggest."
Young herself fielded many of the calls on a
wireless telephone.
In the days after the hurricane, the volume was
low. Staffers ended up doing many things that were not in anyone's job
description. Some radiologists ended up in other departments.
All in all, the 4 days that followed Katrina's
touchdown included less than 130 examinations, a minimal number. Limited
transportation in the city kept the numbers down. Getting specifics about
particular days that immediately followed Katrina is difficult. Time ran
together for people like Young, who estimates that she slept about 7 hours
in the first week. (Bluth was not present during the first wave.)
Ochsner went into the storm with three generators
that were expected to provide emergency power to the whole hospital. One
had literally blown away early on, according to Young. The other generator
promptly blew a circuit board. A technician was on hand, and he retrieved
the single replacement board that was in storage only to find out that it
was nonoperational.
More generators were ordered and the units were
shipped immediately. When they got to city limits, the generators were
turned back by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). One of the
lessons learned? "We probably need more stored generators so we don't rely
on having to bring them in from the outside." Bluth says.
The circuit board was flown in a few days later.
Even though Bluth has been thinking about
disaster preparedness for years, the severity of the power outage
surprised him. "People expected the power to be off for a day, or two, or
three—not weeks. So, I think the extent of this was well beyond most
disasters," Bluth says.
HELP CAME FROM THE COMMUNITY
The surrounding and vendor community proved to be
more helpful than FEMA or the Red Cross. After the hurricane, the airspace
was described as resembling a war zone because of all the helicopter
traffic. Employees could not understand how it was possible to get all of
these whirlybirds up in the air, but it was impossible to get food and
water.
Wanting to add to their stock of necessities, the
purchasing director contacted a large box store and a smaller department
store and worked out an agreement: the hospital would take what was
needed, keep a record of all items they removed, and settle up later.
The department administrators hope to get some
smaller individual generator units before next hurricane season. Their MRI
experience taught them that. When they lost power, the MRI units were not
on backup electricity. They did not realize that they needed power to get
a helium level and a cryogen reading. So, they had to search the hospital
for a portable generator to give the MRIs enough electricity for a
reading. These generators had multiple uses during Katrina like powering
portable air-conditioning units. For Ochsner, which offers numerous
off-site clinics, these units have many nondisaster uses.
Why were the MRIs not on backup power? The units
need fresh water, and the staff assumed that they would not be able to
provide that so they were not hooked up to emergency power.
The lack of chilled water, the low cryogen
levels, and the heat and humidity were dangerous conditions for the MRIs.
A decision had to be made: to quench or not to quench. The three
radiologists and Young got together, the radiology department's chain of
command, to discuss the expensive and potentially dangerous procedure.
When they discussed quenching, it was unanimous: it had to be done.
They all knew that if the machine malfunctions
during quenching, a metal port could peel away from the MRI releasing
oxygen-eliminating cryogens into the air. The resulting vacuum would
likely asphyxiate anyone in the room. Two of the three MRI units had the
quench switch located outside the actual room, so there was no danger in
quenching those machines. One unit, however, was in a ballroom-sized space
and the switch was as far from the door as possible. Young volunteered to
quench it.
"Not that I wanted to lose myself, but I couldn't
afford to lose one of the radiologists," says Young. "They were much more
valuable to the hospital than me."
But DeVun would not let her go it alone. When she
flipped the switch, the machine quenched itself just as it was supposed
to. The manufacturer of the unit was quick to act when it discovered the
hospital was without an MRI. It sent a mobile unit to Ochsner as a
donation, and it arrived by the end of the first week.
The storm also ripped the roof off the 11-story
hospital. Water channeled down an unpredictable path, finding both of
Bluth's offices but fortunately not the technology. The radiology
department covered up its high-tech equipment in a low-tech way—garbage
bags and plastic sheeting.
The information services department controlled
the server department on the third floor so radiology did not have to
worry about waterproofing those. These systems were protected, but they
were not immune to the heat. Without power for air conditioning, the
temperature in the server room climbed steadily. When it hit 115 degrees,
the decision was made to shut down the servers.
Radiology employees called their vendors and were
given instructions on directly connecting all of the essential imaging
equipment to two of the 27 workstations in two different reading rooms.
Being without power posed a difficult challenge
for the radiology department. With the exception of mammography, the
department is filmless. Using its single digital portable x-ray unit
begged a single question: which floor should they put it on?
Since the elevators were not operating, the unit
had to be committed to a single floor. It was placed in the ICU/CCU. This
decision also had to be made for the 11 ultrasound units. Since the
machines had wireless capabilities and were battery-operated, they
required only a red plug.
"The portable digital x-ray unit has] greatly
enhanced our productivity. We use a large percentage of portables with the
types of care we provide here at Ochsner," says Bluth. "That's how we
argue and get them. From a storm perspective, I would have loved to have
four portable digital x-ray units. [They in fact had five analog portables
and one digital portable.] They're very expensive, about $300,000 apiece,
versus a normal unit, which is $37,000. It's hard to make that financial
argument from a storm preparation perspective."
Young also sang the praises of the portable
digital x-ray unit, from which they got tremendous productivity. It is
also wireless and operates as long as the server is up. "I could have
handled the entire workload with three digitals," she noted.
CONDENSATION EVERYWHERE
Once the air conditioning was back on, there was
still plenty to worry about. The hot, heavy air had left a thin coat of
condensation all over the hospital. The floors in the cafeteria were as
slick as if they had just been mopped.
Radiology staff rounded up every dehumidifier as
well as every nonelectrical dehumidifying product they could find to help
remove the water from the air in the server room. They also utilized spot
air conditioners that helped lower the temperature by removing humidity
from the air. Circuit boards with a lot of condensation on them are more
likely to blow.
It took about 24 hours to bring the temperature
of the room down to the mid 80s, the temperature that most vendors specify
for safe operations. All in all, the servers were down for more than 2
days.
Three days after the hurricane, one vendor's
technicians arrived and set up a mobile command center and began repairing
diagnostic imaging equipment as well as the process of bringing up the
MRIs. The vendor also used Ochsner as a base so it could go help other
institutions. (The vendor had shipped a generator that was also
confiscated by FEMA.) Ochsner, now on city power, allowed the vendor to
plug into its power.
Vendors not only helped with technological needs.
They provided sustenance as well: one brought in a cooler of jambalaya and
another delivered junk food and Gatorade. With employees that had just
been through a disaster, the hospital became a surreal mix of the
aftermath of a nightmare and a slumber party.
By day five, most of the employees were ready for
a shift change. They were stressed and tired. The region's transportation
infrastructure was not ready for the transition so the plan was altered
and personnel who had sought shelter in Baton Rouge, Houston, and other
locations that were relatively close were brought in.
Technicians across the country had their own
struggles. Far from home, they were also far from work and the paycheck
that accompanies it. Young was able to contact various hospitals and find
temporary work for some of her displaced technologists.
By the time the third shift arrived, there were
still transportation challenges. People could not come directly into New
Orleans, but had to go to Baton Rouge and obtain a police escort.
Bluth tried getting back to the city early on,
but was met with nothing but hurdles and bureaucratic responses from
everyone he spoke with. There were no flights into New Orleans and Highway
110 was blocked from the east. Bluth finally got a flight into Baton Rouge
and drove in from the west to lead the third team and relieve an exhausted
Young.
THE AFTERMATH
Hurricane Katrina taught Ochsner employees the
importance of communication and that the problem goes both ways:
contacting people and being contacted. For the most part, cell phones did
not work. The sources that power cell towers are on the ground, and they
were underwater after the storm. Lacking electricity, very few mobile
phones with a 504 area code worked and it was difficult for employees to
reach the hospital or vice versa.
The e-mail at Ochsner worked intermittently. To
fix that problem, additional Internet service providers were added and
two-way communication was possible again. Unfortunately, not all employees
knew about the new e-mail addresses that came with the additional sites.
Now, Ochsner has more than one site that can accept e-mails and all
employees are aware of it.
Bluth also plans on adding a staff member to the
essential team who will be in charge of fielding phone calls. This new
control room will allow people like Young to concentrate more on duties
that fall within her job description.
The radiology department also faces unique
challenges because it is not an autonomous unit but linked with other
departments. Some of the equipment it has for emergency power is
associated with the emergency department, which is on the first floor and
therefore more susceptible to flood waters.
One of radiology's CT scanners was on the ground
floor, and although the hospital did not flood, the department would have
been in trouble if it had. To protect its valuable technology from leaks,
which the hospital has experienced during heavy rain, Ochsner is in the
process of fabricating a large ceiling pan that has a drain hole that
redirects the water to a safe place. Young wants one in CT specifically
because the air vents that control some of the heat in the gantry are on
top. If water finds its way to those vents, the equipment will be ruined.
The potential for flooding also helped the staff realize that they need
emergency power for sections of the second floor.
"We've realized that we probably would need
another large generator to add another grid. We wanted to add at least
very minimal power to all three of our MRI scanners to be able to read
cryogen levels," says Young. "We'd like to be able to pump our well water
... through our chilled water system so we could make one MRI a functional
unit on total backup power."
When considering disaster preparedness, Young
emphasizes the importance of thinking about the problem from multiple
perspectives.
"Don't think about it just from the short term. A
lot of times, most of us think about getting through an initial disaster
and then we'll be back to normal. In this case, we're 4 months out and
we're still very far from normal. Really thinking through your plan from a
short, mid, and long-range perspective [regarding] what you're going to
need and your staff's ability is crucial."
By early January, the hospital was running at 96%
to 98% capacity. Its outpatient numbers were lower, because of the
decreased population. The number of staff members also decreased.
Pre-Katrina, the hospital had 6,700 employees. After the storm, 1,700
people didn't return to work; 600 new employees were hired.
Those who did return have been critical to
poststorm recovery. "I would have to say, the staff was the number one
asset. Having the right people there with the right attitude and the right
skill mix, that's just essential. You're going to be dead in the water
without that," says Young.